Ðåôåðàò: The Irish Question (Èðëàíäñêèé âîïðîñ)
Moscow 1998
07.05.98
The Irish Question
Moscow State Pedagogical University
Snigir
Aleksei
The Plan:
1. The
position of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom
2. British
policy towards Northern Ireland
3. Theories of political violence in the Northern
Ireland conflict
I The Position of Northern
Ireland within the United Kingdom
The inhabitants of Ireland are mainly Celtic by
origin, and the majority never accepted the Reformation. In 1801 a new law
added Ireland to the United Kingdom. By this time much of the land belonged to
Protestant English landlords, and the Act of Union followed the period in which
rebellions peasants were brutally suppressed. But in the six Northern Counties
the Protestants were not a dominant minority: they were the majority of the
population. Most of them were descendants of Scottish and English settlers who
had moved into Ireland several generations before. They considered themselves
to be Irish but remained as a distinct community, and there was not much
intermarriage. There had been conflicts and battles between the two
communities, still remembered along with their heroes and martyrs.
In 1912, when the liberals were in power, with the
support of the main group of Irish MPs (for Ireland had seats in the UK
parliament). The House of Commons passed a Home Rule Bill, but the House of
Lords delayed it. It was bitterly opposed by the Protestant majority of the people
in the six northern counties and by the M Ps they had elected. They did not
want to be included in a self-governing Ireland dominated by Catholics.
Eventually, the island was partitioned. In 1922 the
greater part became an independent state, and (in 1949) a republic outside the
Commonwealth. Its laws, on divorce and other matters, reflect the influence of
the Catholic Church. The six northern counties remained within the United
Kingdom, with seats in Prime Minister and government responsible for internal
affairs. In the politics of Northern Ireland the main factor has always been
the hostility between Protestants and Catholics
Until 1972 the Northern Irish Parliament (called
Stormont) always had a Protestant majority. By 1960s Catholics produced serious
riots. The police were mainly Protestants. They used their guns. Several
people were killed. The UK Labour government of the time had sympathy with the
Catholics grievances. The Protestant parties regularly supported the
Conservatives, while some MPs elected for Catholic parties took little or no
part in the work of the Parliament.
In 1969 the UK Labour Government sent troops to
Northern Ireland, with others to help impartially to keep order. But to most
Catholics UK troops have become identified with the Union of Northern Ireland
with the UK. Many Catholics don’t like the idea of the division of the island,
but recognize that the union of the North with the Republic could only be
imposed against the wishes of the majority in the North, and would probably
lead to a civil war. Less moderate Catholics have some sympathy with their own
extremists, the Irish Republican Army [IRA], who are prepared to use any means,
including violence, in support of the demand to be united with the Republic of
Ireland.
In 1969-72 the UK governments, first Labour, then
Conservative, tried to persuade the Protestant politicians to agree to changes
which might be acceptable to the Catholics, but made little progress. In 1972
the UK government decided that the independent regime could not solve its
problems, and put an end to it. Since then the internal administration has been
run under the responsibility of the UK cabinet. In political terms this
decision of Mr. Heath’s government was an act of self- sacrifice. Until 1972 the
Irish [Protestant] Unionist MPs had regularly supported the Conservative in the
UK Parliament, but since then they have become an independent group not linked
to any UK party. Most of them, like the Northern Irish Catholic MPs, have
taken little part in UK affair except those involving Northern Ireland.
From 1972 onwards successive UK governments have tried
to find a « political solution» to the Northern Irish problems, that is,
a solution acceptable to most Catholics and most Protestants. Several devices
have been tried with little or no success. Protestant politicians are elected
on programs, which involve refusal to accept compromise.
Meanwhile, the IRA continues its terrorist campaign.
It receives both moral and financial support from some descendants of Irish
people who emigrated to the US. Although so many innocent victims have been
killed, many of them by chance or through mistakes, it does not seem likely
that any different British government policy would have succeed in preventing
the violence that goes on.
Northern Ireland’s economy, based partly on farming,
party on the heavy industries of Belfast, has brought its people to a standard
of living well above that of the Republic, but lower than Great Britain’s.
With the decline of shipbuilding there is no serious unemployment, and vast
seems have been spent by UK governments in attempts to improve the situation.
II British Policy towards
Northern Ireland
The links between Northern Ireland and Britain were
close and of long standing, for Britain’s involvement with Ireland is dated
from the 12th century. Ireland had been ruled directly from Westminster since
1800 under the Act of Union, and the Irish economy was intimately bound up with
that of the rest of the United Kingdom. Moreover, when Britain abandoned the
union after the First World War, it bestowed wide self- government on Only part
of Ireland, the twenty- six county Irish Free State. The remaining six
counties of Northern Ireland were given a regional parliament and government with
limited powers and remained an integral part of the United Kingdom. But there
was no political consensus to the nature of the state to be established.
Northern Ireland was riddled with ethnic and regional divisions, and to crow
all, in 1920s and 1930s its economy was hardly healthy with its inefficient
agriculture and ailing industries. In fact, Britain was faced with a problem
of establishing a regime, which would be self- supporting and would survive
manifold divisions. But Britain failed to find adequate solution to this
problem, and all its attempts brought to a bloody end.
Britain determined both the boundaries and the form of
government in the 1920 Coverment of Ireland Act. The controversial six
counties included a large Catholic minority, some one- third of the population
within Northern Ireland, including some predominantly Catholic areas on the
borders with the Irish Free State. The form of government was modelled on
Westminster and a subordinate regional government and parliament were given restricted
financial powers but almost unlimited powers over such vital matters of
community interest and potential conflict as education, local government, law
and order. The 1920 settlement gave the two- thirds Protestant and Unionist
majority a virtual free hand and ended in anarchy and the fall of Stormont in
1972. From the beginning the British government was anxious that the Catholic
minority in Northern Ireland should accept the legitimacy of the new creation
and to that end Westminster did urge the government of Northern Ireland to
adopt a friendlier and more accommodating attitude towards the minority,
particularly in respect of law enforcement, local government and education.
Nevertheless, in the last analysis, it refused to exercise its sovereignty to
block such divisive measures as the abolition of proportional representation in
local government elections or to counteract sectarian tendencies in education
and law enforcement. The reason that Westminster did not do so was that any
firm stand would have meant the resignation of the unionist government and, in
view of its in built majority, its immediate return to office. Such an
eventuality would have presented alternatives: a humiliating climb down or the
resumption of direct responsibility for the government of the six counties --
the very thing that the 1920 government of Ireland act had been designed to
avoid. As far as Westminster was concerned, minority rights in Northern
Ireland had to be subordinate to the broader interests of the United Kingdom
and British Empire.
III Theories of Political
Violence in the Northern Ireland Conflict.
There have been various attempts to sympathize the
range of theories which have been put forward to explain the Northern Ireland
conflict and to relate these two practical remedies and solutions to the
problem. The diversity of the theories which have been put forward have
necessarily limited attempts to test them concisely using empirical data. For
example, aside from the theories such as religion and class which have been
most widely canvassed, explanations as diverse as Freudian social psychology
and caste have been put forward. Clearly it is impossible to attempt to test
all these theories using survey data, and for the purposes of this analysis,
only the major theories are examined. There is a fundamental dichotomy in these
theories between those, which are economic in nature and non-economic. Each has
particular implications for the future and for the possibility of solving the
conflict. From the economic interpretation it logically follows that the
conflict is essentially bargainable, and that a change in socioeconomic
conditions will after the intensity of the conflict. Better living conditions,
more jobs and material affluence will make people less interested in an
atomistic conflict centering on religion. By contrast, most non-economic
theories imply that it is a non-bargainable, zero- sum conflict: the gains of
one side will always be proportional to the losses of the other. These
theories are summarized in the words: « the problem is that there is no
solution». The Irish, according to popular account are an intensely
historically minded people. Present day problems they explain by what seems to
others an unnecessary long and involved recital of event so distant as to shade
into the gloom of prehistory. History indeed lies at the basis as to shade
into propagandist issue of contemporary Ireland: one nation or to? To many
radicals, this issue is already an archaism in a world increasingly dominated
by transnational capitalism. They prefer to substitute an analysis of «
divided class» for an outdated propagandist device adopted to split the
workers. The idea of « two nations» occupying the same territory has a long
provenance throughout the world.
Catholics tend to have lower status jobs than
Protestants but once we take differences in family backgrounds and education
into account the disadvantage disappears. There is no evidence of occupational
discrimination. In terms of the financial returns of work, Catholics receive a
lower wage than Protestants, and this persists even after family background,
education and occupation are held constant. There are a variety of
explanations, which could account for this pattern, none of which, unfortunately,
can be tested by the data to hand. Protestants tend to predominate in well
paid, capital intensive industries, such as engineering and shipbuilding, while
Catholics are concentrated in more marginal and competitive industries, such as
building and contrasting, with generally lower wage rates. Consequently, it is
possible for a Protestant to receive a high wage for performing the same task
as a Catholic working in another industry. Since most of these
capital-intensive industries are more extensively unionized than their counter
parts, it could be argued that Protestant bargaining power, and hence wage
levels, are greater than similar non-unionized Catholic workers. Finally,
these differences in incomes could be interpreted as the direct result of religious
discrimination against Catholics, with Catholics simply being paid less than
Protestants in the same jobs.
There is, therefore, not much of an economic basis for
the Ulster conflict—actual differences between the two communities can be
explained by family background and inherited privilege. There remains,
however, the possibility that it is less the objective economic differences
that cause the conflict than individual subjective perceptions of those
differences.
It is often argued that economic deprivation is a
major cause of violence, rioting with Catholics feeling economically deprived
compared to Protestants, becoming frustrated, and venting their frustration
through aggression: much of the British government’s policy for Northern
Ireland has focused on alleviating the economic deprivation of the Catholic
minority. But in fact, socioeconomic considerations have little to do with
rioting either for the population as a whole, or among Catholics and
Protestants considered separately. The combined effect of all socioeconomic
variables, is a negligible. Only one of the five socioeconomic variables has a
statistically significant effect. Unemployment has no significant effect, in
spite of the prominent role it plays in official thinking.
On this evidence, it seems unlikely that economic
changes will reduce conflict in Northern Ireland. It is, however, possible
that economic improvements for the Catholic community would effect the climate
of opinion among Catholics as a whole, and hence reduce conflict.
Religion by itself does not have much to do with
rioting. Catholics, in particular, are not significantly more likely than
Protestants to riot. The recent troubles may have been presaged by Catholic
civil rights activity in 1968 and 1969, which led to violence, but in 1973 the
violence had escalated and spread to both communities more or less equally.
Nor do religious beliefs have any significant effect; the devout are neither
more nor less likely to riot then their less devout compatriots. In this, as
in other ways, the conflict is not one of religious belief.
Finally, political views about the origins of the
conflict are important for Catholics but not as much for Protestants. Let us
examine Catholics, beginning with the comparison of two groups: those who think
Catholics are entirely to blame for the troubles and those who think no blame
at all attaches to Catholics. The first group is some 18 percent less likely
to riot than is the second group. So for Catholics, rioting seems to have
strong instrumental overtones in that those who have well defined views that
attribute blame to Protestants are much more likely to riot. Their riots, like
many block riots in the United States, are in part a means of seeking address
for grievances. But for Protestants the interpretation placed on the conflict
is much less important. Those who think Protestants themselves are entirely to
blame are only 9 percent less likely to riot then are those who think Catholics
are entirely to blame. Protestant rioting thus seems to be more reactive in
the sense that its stems not so much from a coherent view about their aims, or
their adversaries’ aims, or the nature of the conflict, as it does from other
sources, notably reaction to Catholic violence.
Inhabitant æèòåëü
Majority áîëüøèíñòâî
Rebellion âîññòàíèå
Peasant êðåñòüÿíèí
Suppress çàïðåùàòü, ïîäàâëÿòü
Minority ìåíüøèíñòâî
Descendant ïîòîìîê
Martyr ìó÷åíèê
Partition ðàñ÷ëåíÿòü
Internal âíóòðåííèé
Hostility âðàæäåáíîñòü
Riot
áóíò ,áåñïîðÿäêè
Grievance
æàëîáà , îáèäà
Impartially
áåñïðèñòðàñòíî
Regime
ðåæèì
Campaign
êàìïàíèÿ
Intimate
îáúÿâëÿòü , õîðîøî çíàêîìûé
Bound ãðàíè÷èòü
Bestow
äàâàòü, äàðèòü, ïîìåùàòü
Riddled
èçðåøå÷åííûé
Controversial ñïîðíûé
Subordinate
ïîä÷èíåííûé
Urge
óáåæäàòü, ïîáóæäåíèå
Enforcement
äàâëåíèå, ïðèíóäèòåëüíûé
Sovereignty
ñóâåðåíèòåò, Âåðõîâíàÿ âëàñòü
Abolition
îòìåíà, óíè÷òîæåíèå
Counteract sectarian tendencies íåéòðàëèçîâàòü ñåêòàíòñêèå íàêëîííîñòè
Resignation
ñìèðåíèå, îòñòàâêà
Eventuality
âîçìîæíûé ñëó÷àé
Humiliating
óíèçèòåëüíûé
Resumption
âîçîáíîâëåíèå
Diversity
ðàçëè÷èå, ðàçíîîáðàçèå
Empirical
ýìïèðè÷åñêèé
Canvass
îáñóæäàòü, ñîáèðàòü(ãîëîñà)
Diverse ðàçíûé
,èíîé
Caste
êàñòà
Survey
èçó÷àåìûé, ðàññìàòðèâàåìûé
Dichotomy
äåëåíèå êëàññà íà 2 ïðîòèâîïîñòàâëÿåìûõ ïîäêëàññà,
Bargainable
âûãîäíûé
Gloom
ìðàê , óíûíèå
Contemporary
ñîâðåìåííûé
Device
óñòðîéñòâî, ñðåäñòâî, ïëàí, äåâèç
Wage
çàðïëàòà
Hence ñ
ýòèõ ïîð, ñëåäîâàòåëüíî
Income
äîõîä
Inherited
íàñëåäîâàííûé
Deprived
ëèøåííûé
Frustration
ðàññòðîéñòâî(ïëàíîâ), êðóøåíèå(íàäåæä)
Alleviating
ñìÿã÷àþùèé, îáëåã÷àþùèé
Negligible
íåçíà÷èòåëüíûé
Recent
íîâûé, ñâåæèé, ñîâðåìåííûé
Presaged
ïðåäñêàçàííûé
Devout
èñêðåííèé, íàáîæíûé
Compatriots
ñîîòå÷åñòâåííèê
Coherent
ïîíÿòíûé, ïîñëåäîâàòåëüíîñòü
Adversary
ïðîòèâíèê, âðàã
The List of Books:
1. Richard Kearney. The Irish Mind. Exploring
Intellectual Traditions. Dublin 1985
2. Harold Orel. Irish History and Culture.
Aspects of a people’s heritage. Dublin 1979
3. Jonah Alexander, Alan O’Day. Ireland’s
Terrorist Dilemma. Dordrecht 1986
4. T.M. Devine, David Dickson. Ireland and
Scotland .Edinburgh 1983
5. Peter Bromhead. Life in Modern Britain
.Longman Group UK Limited, 1992